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One of the central dilemmas in social welfare policy is how to protect families
from financial hardship without causing them to become too reliant upon so-
cial assistance. The United States' approach to this dilemma has been to re-
strict cash assistance to the least "employable" segments of the population (sin-
gle parents or families with a disabled adult) and to provide means-tested aid
to these groups on an extended basis. This approach guarantees that certain
segments of the population receive minimal income support, while preserving
work incentives for the remainder of the population.
The French have taken a different tack to resolve this dilemma. First, rather
than target aid only to the unemployable, France provides assistance to nearly
all families with children. Second, rather than encouraging some segments of
the population to remain permanently out of the labor force, France encourages
all women with children to work. Thus, while France provides generous trans-
fer assistance to families when their children are young, it sharply reduces
transfer payments when the youngest child reaches age 3. In addition, other
French policies (e.g., universal public nursery school, universal medical insur-
ance, and mandatory maternity leave) make it easier for women to enter the
labor force when their children reach age 3.
This paper will examine the impact of two time-limited transfer programs
in France on the employment rates of women with children. The first, the
Single-Parent Allowance (API) program, is a means-tested program for single
parents. Much like the U.S. Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)
program, this program offers means-tested assistance to single parents under a
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high implicit tax rate. However, unlike the AFDC program, this program is
provided only until the youngest child reaches age three or for one year after
divorce/separation from or death of a spouse. The second program, the Parental
Education Allowance, provides a payment to women who have three or more
children and who take an employment leave following the birth of a child. Like
the API, this program continues until the youngest child reaches age 3.
The French experience with time-limited benefits is relevant to the current
U.S. debate over welfare reform, since many analysts in the United States have
argued for a limit on the length of time that a single parent may receive welfare.
They argue that this policy would prevent families from permanently relying
on welfare as a means of support and thus would promote the economic suffi-
ciency of single-parent families (Ellwood 1988). Currently, little is known
about the impact of time-limited benefits; while there is a time limit on the
unemployment insurance program, the United States has not experimented
with placing a limit on welfare benefits for single-parent families. Thus, an
examination of the French experience may be an important first step in de-
termining how such a policy might affect the United States.
The French experience is also relevant to our understanding of the trade-
offs between economic protection and economic flexibility. One of the classic
complaints about the U.S. welfare system is that it creates an "underclass" of
families with little attachment to the labor force.
1 The French system of time-
limited benefits may avert this problem if it is more successful in integrating
women into the labor force. Placing a time limit on welfare benefits may in-
crease work efforts of single parents in the short run, since it will decrease the
returns to remaining out of the labor force. In addition, it may have important
long-run effects: women may invest more in education and training if they
anticipate that they cannot permanently rely on welfare for support. Finally,
this policy may have important spillover effects if reducing welfare use by one
family decreases the incentive for other families in the community to use
welfare.
2
A second component of the social protection-economic flexibility debate is
the extent to which investments in children affect the future productivity of the
work force. For younger children, France provides greater assistance in the
form of both cash transfers and medical insurance coverage than does
the United States. For older children (age 3-5), France provides less direct
income support to some groups of families than the United States does, but it
also more invests heavily in education through its high-quality universal public
nursery school system.
3 Finally, the French system clearly provides greater in-
1. See Murray (1984) for a recent exposition of this view.
2. See Wilson (1987) for an exposition of this view.
3. Kamerman (1991) argues that attendance at public nursery school in France is important to
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ducement for single mothers with children over age 3 to work. This in turn
may have important effects on their children's development.
4
This paper adds to excellent descriptions of social welfare institutions in
France for women and children by Starzec and David (1991), Jenson and Kan-
trow (1990), and Lefaucheur (1991). For a review of the extensive U.S. litera-
ture on poverty and social welfare programs, see Sawhill (1989) or Moffit
(1992). Finally, Ray, Jeandidier, and Carvoyeur (1988) present an analysis of
family allowances for a sample of women in Luxembourg and Lorraine. The
chief contribution of this paper is the explicit comparison of programs and
their impact on women's work effort in France and the United States.
10.1 Social Welfare Institutions in the United States and France
10.1.1 Cash Assistance Programs
This section provides information on social welfare programs in France and
the United States in 1987 for families with children. These programs are sum-
marized in appendix A.
5 All dollar amounts are in units of 1990 U.S. dollars.
6
France
France offers cash assistance to families with children through a complex
set of child and family allowance programs administered by the federal govern-
ment. These programs are designed to serve multiple objectives: targeting as-
sistance to families with children, increasing the French birth rate, and pro-
tecting economically vulnerable families (single parents and families with
three or more children).
France offers assistance on a demogrant basis through its Family Allowance
Program. This program offers assistance to all families with two or more chil-
dren. Monthly payments increase with both the number and the age of children
in the family: a family with two children ages 10-14 would receive a monthly
4. The desirability of encouraging mothers to work is controversial. On the one hand, a working
mother may have less time to devote to her children; on the other hand, she may become a better
role model if she is able to find a fulfilling job. See Blau and Grossberg (1990) for recent empirical
research on this topic.
5. This analysis ignores the impact of differences in nonrefundable income tax subsidies to
families with children. Under the French Quotient Familial, the marginal income tax rate declines
with family size. Families compute their total tax liability by dividing taxable income by an index
that varies by family size; they then compute their income tax liability on the basis of each share.
In the United States, the federal income tax system allows families to claim a tax deduction for
each dependent child.
6. To convert from French to U.S. dollars, this paper uses an estimate of the purchasing power
parity for consumption of French relative to U.S. dollars in 1990 (OECD 1992). It adjusts this
index for the relative inflation rates in each country from 1987 to 1990, using the gross domestic
product deflators reported in International Monetary Fund (1992).304 Maria J. Hanratty
payment of $105, while a family with three children in the same age range
would receive $257.
France offers three programs to assist economically vulnerable families on
a time-limited basis. The first program is the Allowance for Young Children,
which provides a monthly payment of $119 to families with a child under age
3. The "short form" of this program is provided on a non-means-tested basis
from the fourth month after conception to the third month after pregnancy.
The "long form" of this program continues for low-income families until the
youngest child reaches age 3. To qualify for assistance, both the mother and
child must complete a federally mandated schedule of medical care visits.
A second time-limited program is the Parental Education Allowance.
7 This
program provides a monthly payment of $367 to parents who take a leave from
their job following the adoption or birth of a child. Unlike the Young Child
Allowance, this program is only available to families with three or more chil-
dren. To qualify, the parent must have worked two of the preceding ten years.
If they remain out of the labor force, parents may continue to receive the full
benefit until their youngest child reaches age 3. After the third year, parents
may receive a half-payment of $ 183 per month if they work part-time or enter
a vocational education program.
A final program that assists families on a time-limited basis is the Single-
Parent Allowance (API). This program assists low-income single parents who
recently have had a child or experienced a divorce/separation from or death of
a spouse. The maximum payment for a mother with two children is $730 per
month. Like the U.S. AFDC program, this program is intended to temporarily
assist single parents in times of crisis. Unlike the AFDC program, the API
program tightly limits the duration of benefits. While a single parent in the
United States may receive AFDC until her youngest child reaches age 18, a
single parent in France may receive the API until her youngest child reaches
age three or for up to twelve consecutive months within the eighteen months
following the loss of a spouse.
France provides further cash assistance to vulnerable families through its
Family Support Allowance, a small monthly payment provided on a non-
means-tested basis to single-parent families. In addition, the Large-Family
Supplement provides a monthly payment of $107 to low-income families with
three or more children all over age 3. Finally, the Return to School Allowance
provides a small payment to low-income families to defray the costs of school
supplies at the beginning of the academic year.
France provides in-kind assistance to low-income families through its Hous-
ing Allowance program. This program provides cash payments to low-income
families to help cover the costs of rent or mortgage payments. Both families
7. Despite the title of this program, the parent is not required to enter an education or training
program to receive this benefit.305 Social Welfare Programs for Women and Children: U.S. vs. France
with a dependent child and newly married couples under age 40 may qualify
for this program.
According to Starzec and David (1991), these programs provide assistance
to a large number of families in France. By far the largest assistance program
is the Family Allowance program, which served 3.6 million families in 1988,
followed by the Return to School Allowance program (2 million children),
the Young Child Allowance program (1.6 million families), and the Housing
Allowance program (1.1 million households). The two time-limited programs
were less extensive, with the Single-Parent Allowance serving 130,000 fami-
lies and the Parental Education Allowance serving 160,000 families.
8
United States
The U.S. transfer system differs from the French transfer system on a num-
ber of dimensions. First, while France provides assistance to all families with
children, the U.S. system assists only low-income families. Second, the United
States targets assistance more directly toward single-parent families. Finally,
while the French programs provide greater assistance to families with young
children, U.S. programs do not vary by age of children.
The main cash assistance program in the United States is Aid to Families
with Dependent Children (AFDC). This joint federal-state program provides
cash assistance primarily to low-income single-parent families with children.
In 1987, some states also allowed two-parent households to receive AFDC
under stricter eligibility requirements; however, two-parent families repre-
sented only 6 percent of all AFDC recipients in these states.
9 Monthly benefits
vary substantially across states. In 1987, the maximum monthly benefit for a
family of three ranged from $133 to $845 per month, with a median of $400
per month. This program served 3.8 million families, or approximately 64 per-
cent of all poor single-parent families in 1987.
A second U.S. program that assists the low-income population is the Food
Stamps program. This federal program provides low-income families and indi-
viduals with coupons that can be used to purchase food. In 1987, the maximum
coupon amount for a family of three was $242, reduced by 30 cents for every
8. These programs appear to reach a large share of their target population. In 1987, there were
365,000 families in France with three or more children and a child under age 3 (author's calcula-
tions from the 1987 Enquete sur l'Emploi). Thus, the Parental Education Allowance reached an
estimated 44 percent of all categorically eligible women. It is more difficult to compute the number
of families eligible for the API. While the data available make it possible to identify single parents
who are eligible for this program because they have a child under age 3 (84,000 in 1987), it is not
possible to identify single parents who qualify because they have recently lost a spouse due to
divorce/separation or death.
9. The Family Support Act of 1988 requires all states to provide assistance to families with two-
parent families in which the principal earner is unemployed. However, partly due to more stringent
eligibility requirements for this group, two-parent families remain a very small part (7 percent) of
the AFDC population in 1991.306 Maria J. Hanratty
dollar of countable income. This program served 19.1 million individuals, or
approximately 59 percent of all poor individuals in 1987.
Finally, the United States provides assistance to working poor families with
children through the earned income tax credit. This program provides a refund-
able income tax credit equal to 14 percent of earnings, to a maximum of $900;
it then decreases by 10 cents for every $1 of earnings above $7,300. This pro-
gram served 7.5 million families in 1987; of these, 2.9 million received a
cash refund.


























Transfers for Families with Children: the United States versus


















































































































Note: "Maximum" indicates maximum transfer payments for a family with no other income; "min-
imum" indicates transfer payments for a high-income family (over $24,000 for a family with one
child, $27,000 for a family with two children, and $32,000 for a family with three children).
"U.S. transfers include food stamp and median AFDC benefits. Calculations assume that single-
parent family is eligible for AFDC and that two-parent family receives food stamps only.
Trench transfers include Family Allowances, Family Support Allowance, Parental Education Al-
lowance, Allowance to Young Children, Large-Family Supplement, Return to School Allowance,
Single-Parent Allowance, and Housing Allowance, as described in appendix A. Calculations as-
sume that two-child family has one child age 10-14, that three-child family has two children ages
10-14, and that four-child family has two children ages 10-14 and one child age 15-16. Calcula-
tions also assume that family receives maximum housing allowance.307 Social Welfare Programs for Women and Children: U.S. vs. France
indicates the total transfer income available to families in each country. The
first two columns indicate maximum transfer payments to single- and two-
parent families in the United States. The next four columns indicate both maxi-
mum and minimum payments to single- and two-parent families in France.
This table highlights several differences between the two systems. First,
maximum transfer payments are much more generous in France than in the
United States. For example, a single parent with two children under age 3
would receive $8,850 in France and $7,260 in the United States, while a mar-
ried couple with two children age 3 would receive $6,200 in France and $3,700
in the United States. Second, while the United States offers virtually no non-
means-tested assistance, French demogrant payments can be quite substantial:
the minimum income for a family with three children ranges from $3,000 to
$4,000 in France, while the minimum income for a family with four children
ranges from $5,000 to $6,000.
Third, while both countries provide higher transfer payments to single par-
ents than to two-parent families, French payments also provide relatively high
levels of support to families with three or more children. For example, the
maximum payment for a married couple increases from $6,180 to $10,400 as
the number of children increases from one to three, whereas they would in-
crease from $3,700 to $4,400 in the United States. This reflects both the French
goal of increasing the birth rate and the view in France that large families are
economically vulnerable and need additional income support.
1
0
Finally, transfer payments decrease substantially in France when the youn-
gest child reaches age 3, reflecting the termination of French time-limited ben-
efits. This decline is particularly large for economically vulnerable groups in
France: single parents and families with three or more children. For example,
the maximum payment to a single parent with two children declines from
$8,852 to $4,973 when the youngest child reaches age three, while the payment
to a couple with three children declines from $10,400 to $7,300. In the United
States, transfers remain constant until the youngest child reaches age 18.
10.1.2 Medical Assistance Programs
In addition to providing more extensive income support than the United
States does, France offers greater access to medical care through its universal
health insurance program. This program covers nearly 100 percent of the popu-
lation; it is administered through the social security system and financed
through a payroll tax. Families must pay a coinsurance rate of 25 percent of
physician fees, 20 percent of hospital charges, and 30 percent to 60 percent of
pharmaceutical costs (Rosa and Lanois 1990). In addition, both private insur-
ance and municipal assistance to low-income families may defray costs not
covered by the federal program.
10. For example, Centre d'Etude des Revenus et des Couts (1987) identifies both of these two
groups as economically vulnerable.308 Maria J. Hanratty
The U.S. provides medical care to low-income families with children
through its Medicaid program. This joint federal and state program offers com-
prehensive, first-dollar coverage of most medical services to low-income fami-
lies with children. However, due to tight financial and categorical eligibility
criteria, this program reaches just a fraction of the poor: only 53 percent of
poor children were covered by the Medicaid program in 1987.
10.1.3 Day Care
France provides access to day care for a much broader segment of the popu-
lation than does the United States. For children above age 3, France has made
day care universally available through its public nursery school system. For
children under age 3, France, like the United States, uses a combination of
limited public provision and subsidies to increase access to care.
The key program in France that provides day care to families with children
over age 3 is the French public nursery schools (ecoles maternelles). This sys-
tem is open at no cost to all children from the age that they are first toilet
trained until the age of school entry (age 6). In 1989, 36 percent of children
age 2, 98 percent of children age 3, and nearly 100 percent of children ages
4-5 attended nursery school. While the nursery school is viewed as a necessary
component of a child's education, it also plays an important custodial role,
since it is open for the majority of the working day: 8:30 A.M. to 4:30 P.M. daily
except Wednesday, and one-half day on Saturday."
For children under age 3, France offers a combination of publicly provided
care and subsidies to help parents obtain day care. Subsidized day care is pro-
vided through its public daycare centers (creches). While the most common
form of the creche is the public day nursery, the French are now experimenting
with daycare centers operating on a smaller scale, in family homes or through
parent cooperatives. While these centers are an attractive daycare option, there
are far too few slots currently available to meet the demand for daycare ser-
vices (Bergmann 1992).
France also subsidizes the purchase of day care from mother's helpers (assis-
tantes maternelles)—federally certified childcare workers who care for chil-
dren in their homes. These workers are exempted from both the employer's and
employee's social security tax contributions, which together amount to over 40
percent of wages.
1
2 In addition, the federal government allows families to de-
duct up to 10,000 francs per year from their taxable income for childcare ex-
penses.
In 1986, 12 percent of all children under 3 with two parents working outside
of the home received day care through public daycare centers, 26 percent re-
11. Schools are closed on Wednesday afternoon to allow children to attend religious education
classes. Parents may purchase day care for times when the nursery school is not in session on a
fee-paying basis (Kamerman 1991).
12. The employee's contribution is exempted from taxation, while the parent receives a rebate
of any payments made for the employer's contribution.309 Social Welfare Programs for Women and Children: U.S. vs. France
ceived assistance through certified mother's helpers, and 6 percent received
day care through family daycare centers. The remaining 56 percent received
day care from other sources, such as nonregulated day care or from friends and
other family members (Starzec and David 1991).
The U.S. system is more fragmented than the French system, with both fed-
eral and state governments playing a role in providing child care. While the
federal government operates over forty programs to expand daycare availabil-
ity, over 80 percent of all federal spending in 1988 was devoted to the four
programs described below (U.S. General Accounting Office 1989).
1
3
The federal government subsidizes public childcare centers through its Title
XX Social Services Block Grant program, an unrestricted grant that states may
use to pay for child care and other social services. Total spending for this pro-
gram in 1987 was $2.7 billion, of which approximately $660 million were
allocated to daycare services.
1
4
The federal government directly sponsors childcare services through its
Head Start program. This enriched education program prepares disadvantaged
children ages 3-5 for primary school. Unlike the French nursery school, most
Head Start programs operate for half a day: only one-fifth of all program parti-
cipants in 1987 attended Head Start for a full six-hour day. In 1987, this pro-
gram served 450,000 children, or 17 percent of poor children ages 3-5. Total
expenditures on the program for 1987 were $1.1 billion.
Finally, the federal government supports child care through its dependent
care tax credit. This is a nonrefundable income tax credit of up to 30 percent
of employment-related expenses on dependent care, up to a limit of $2,400 per
child and $4,800 per family. Total tax expenditures for this item were $3.8
billion in 1987.
In 1987, 17 percent of all U.S. children under age 3 with a working mother
were cared for in public daycare centers: 33 percent were cared for by nonrela-
tives in informal settings; the remaining 50 percent were cared for by relatives.
Of children ages 3-4 with a working mother, 36 percent were cared for in
organized childcare or education facilities, 22 percent were cared for by non-
relatives, and 42 percent were cared for by relatives (U.S. Department of Com-
merce 1990).
10.1.4 Maternity Leave
France has a legally mandated maternity leave policy that requires all em-
ployers to provide a job-protected leave at the time of the birth or adoption of
a child. The length of the required leave varies with the number of children in
the family: it begins six-eight weeks prior to expected date of delivery and
ends ten-eighteen weeks after childbirth. During this period, the parent may
13. See Robins (1991) for an excellent overview of the U.S. childcare system.
14. Unless otherwise noted, all estimates of expenditures and recipiency rates presented in this
section are from U.S. House of Representatives (1988, 1989).310 Maria J. Hanratty
also qualify for maternity insurance, which replaces 84 percent of average
earnings.
In addition to standard maternity leave, parents may also qualify for an ex-
tended leave under the Parental Education Leave program.
1
5 This program
allows parents to claim a two-year job-protected leave at the end of the standard
maternity leave. Firms with fewer than 100 employees may be exempted from
this requirement if they can demonstrate that this leave is harmful to their com-
pany. Parents may combine this leave with the Parental Education Allowance,
described above.
As of 1987, the U.S. policy regarding family leave was much more limited
than that of France. At the federal level, the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of
1980 required all employers who operate disability insurance programs to
cover pregnancy-related disabilities. This legislation is very short term in na-
ture, since it applies only to the period during which a mother cannot work due
to pregnancy-related disabilities (Trzcinski and Alpert 1994).
l
6 In addition, in
1987, thirteen states (twenty-five states by 1991) had enacted legislation re-
quiring employer-provided parental leave. These laws require employers to
provide an unpaid job-protected leave of from six to twenty-four weeks for the




10.2 Predictions and Estimation Approach
This section will examine the impact of the termination of two time-limited
transfer programs in France. The first is a means-tested program for single
parents, the API program described above. The second, Parental Education
Leave, is a program for families with three or more children.
10.2.1 Single-Parent Family Programs
Figure 10.1 illustrates the income-earnings frontier for single parents in
France and the United States. As shown, both U.S. single parents and French
single parents with a child under age 3 have income-earnings frontiers that
exhibit a flat "notch" around zero earnings, reflecting the presence of a means-
tested welfare program with a high tax rate on earnings. However, while the
U.S. income-earnings frontier remains constant, the French income-earnings
frontier changes substantially when the youngest child reaches age 3.
As shown, there are two important changes in the income-earnings frontier
15. As before (see note 7 above), the parent does not need to participate in an education or
training program to qualify.
16. In 1980, when this legislation was enacted, pregnant women who were covered by disability
programs were covered for an average of six weeks of benefits.
17. The U.S. government recently passed the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993. The act
requires employers who have at least fifty employees to guarantee an unpaid job-protected leave
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Fig. 10.1 Income-earnings frontier for single parents in the United States and
France
in France that should increase the employment rate of single parents when
their youngest child reaches age 3. First, the income-earnings frontier shifts
downward, reflecting a decline in total nonlabor income available to French
single parents. Second, the flat notch around zero earnings is eliminated, re-
flecting a decline from 100 percent to 6 percent in the tax rate on earnings.312 Maria J. Hanratty
Both of these changes should increase the incentive to work: since single moth-
ers have less nonlabor income, they will find it harder to forgo market work.
In addition, since they realize a larger gain in total income as their earnings
increase, they will be more likely to substitute market for nonmarket work.
One way to estimate the impact of the termination of French time-limited
transfer benefits is to compute the difference between the employment rate of
French single parents with a youngest child age 3-5 and those with a child
age 0-2:
(1) AEfs = h(AGfs, Atfs) + 6, + <J>S,
where / indicates France, s indicates single parent, AEfs represents the differ-
ence in employment rates of women with a youngest child age 3-5 versus age
0-2, h(AG, At) represents the impact of the change in implicit tax rate and
income guarantee under the transfer system when the youngest child changes
from age 0-2 to age 3-5, Qf represents factors common to France, and <£>s repre-
sents factors that are common to single parents and could change the employ-
ment rate of French women when their youngest child reaches age 3.
The estimator shown in equation (1) is likely to overestimate the impact of
terminating time-limited transfers, because it ignores other important factors
common to France, such as the dramatic expansion in public day care or the
termination of government-mandated maternity leave, which occurs when the
youngest child reaches age 3. Failure to account for these factors, designated
0fin equation (1), could clearly lead to a biased estimate of the impact of time-
limited benefits.
One way to deal with this problem is to compute the difference between the
change in employment of single parents and the change in employment of two-
parent families when the youngest child reaches age 3:
(2) AEfs - AE^ = h(Atfs, AGfs) + <&, - <Dm,
where m designates married and the remaining terms are as defined above. As
shown, this "difference in difference" estimator eliminates the 6,. term in equa-
tion (1), thus eliminating factors common to France that may affect the em-
ployment rates of women with children.
1
8 However, this estimator may still be
biased because it does not control for other underlying differences between
single and married women, designated $>s — <£m above, which may affect the
relative change in employment. For example, differences in the availability of
informal daycare services, family income, or alternative costs of time all may
cause women in single-parent and two-parent families to have different rates
18. Note that equation (2) assumes there is no change in transfers for two-parent families in
France. However, as shown in figure 10.2, there is a slight decline in the income guarantee for this
group when their youngest child reaches age 3, which in turn may cause their employment rate to
increase. Thus, the estimates presented here may underestimate the impact of the termination of
the API.313 Social Welfare Programs for Women and Children: U.S. vs. France
at which their employment increases when their youngest child reaches age
three.
To control for these factors, one can compute a "difference in difference in
difference" estimator, which computes the difference between France and the
United States in the difference between single- and two-parent families in the
change in employment when the youngest child changes from age 0-2 to age
3-5:
(3) (AEfs - bEjJ - (AEus - AEJ = h(Atfs,AGfs),
where u indexes United States and all remaining terms are defined above. To
the extent that the United States is a valid control group for France (i.e., the
underlying difference $>s — <£m is the same in both countries) this estimator
will produce an unbiased estimate of the impact of the termination of time-
limited transfer programs for single parents in France.
10.2.2 Programs for Large Families (Parental Education Allowance)
As noted earlier, the French system provides supplemental assistance on a
time-limited basis to families with three or more children through its Parental
Education Allowance (PEA). Panel C of figure 10.2 illustrates how this pro-
gram changes the incentive for married women with three or more children to
work when their youngest child reaches age 3. As shown, when the youngest
child reaches age three, the income guarantee available to this group declines
markedly, reflecting the elimination of the PEA payment. In addition, the im-
plicit tax rate on earnings decreases substantially: before the youngest child
reaches age three, members of this group effectively face an infinite tax rate
on earnings since they must remain out of the labor force to qualify for the
PEA, whereas afterward the implicit tax rate is near zero (6 percent). Both of
these changes should increase the incentive of women in large families to
work, since they imply a decrease in nonlabor income available to "spend" on
nonmarket activities, and an increase in the return to market work.
To isolate the impact of the Parental Education Allowance from that of the
API program, this analysis will focus on married women only. As before, there
are three possible methods of estimating the impact of the Parental Education
Allowance. First, for women with large families (three-plus children), one
could compute the difference between the employment rates of those with a
youngest child age zero-two and those with a child age three-five. As before,
this estimator does not control for other factors that change at the time the
youngest child reaches age three, such as the increase in publicly provided day
care. Second, one could compute a difference-in-difference estimator, which
would compute the difference between large families (three-plus children) and
small families (one-two children) in the difference between the employment
rates of women with a youngest child age 3-5 versus age 0-2. While this would
eliminate the potentially contaminating impact of factors that do not vary by
family size, it still would not control for factors that affect the underlying314 Maria J. Hanratty
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Figure 10.2 Income-earnings frontier for two-parent families in the United
States and France
change in employment of small versus large families.
1
9 Third, one could com-
pute a difference-in-difference-in-difference estimator, which computes the
difference between the United States and France in the difference between
large and small families in the change in employment when the youngest child
reaches age 3:315 Social Welfare Programs for Women and Children: U.S. vs. France
(4) (A£^ - AEfs) - (AEub - AEJ = h(Atfs,AGfs),
where / indicates France, u indicates United States, b indicates "big" family
(three or more children), 5 indicates "small" family (two or fewer children),
and the other terms are defined above.
10.3 Estimated Impacts
10.3.1 Data
The primary data source used for France is the French Enquete sur l'Emploi
for 1987. This annual survey of 68,000 households in France asks detailed
questions about labor force activity and family demographic characteristics.
Given its large size and its focus on labor force measures, this survey is well
suited for an analysis of the impact of time-limited transfer programs on em-
ployment. Unfortunately, this survey contains limited information on family
income and thus does not make it possible to analyze the impact of these pro-
grams on economic well-being.
The primary data source used for the United States is the March Current
Population Survey. This annual survey of over 60,000 households in the United
States contains detailed information on family demographic characteristics,
labor force activity, and family income sources.
In France, cohabiting couples with children represent a relatively large share
of all families with children (4.5 percent), whereas they represent a relatively
small share of families with children in the United States (1.4 percent). For
purposes of this analysis, cohabiting couples are included with married cou-
ples. There are two reasons for this classification. First, in both countries, co-
habiting couples are not legally eligible for transfer programs targeted toward
single-parent families. Second, the women in this group exhibit employment




Table 10.2 presents estimates of the employment rates of women with chil-
dren, by age of youngest child in the family. The first three columns present
estimates for France; the second three columns present estimates for the
United States. This table classifies the patterns of employment in the preceding
week by total employment (one or more hours), full-time work (thirty-five or
more hours), and part-time work (one to thirty-four hours).
19. For example, women with three or more children may be more likely to remain out of the
labor force altogether and thus show a smaller increase in employment than do women with one
or two children.
20. One obtains very similar results if one drops cohabiting couples or if one treats them as a
separate group in the analysis. However, if cohabitors are treated as a part of the single-parent
family group, the estimated effects become much weaker.316 Maria J. Hanratty
Table 10.2 Employment Rates of Women in the United States and France
(standard errors in parentheses)
France United States
Employment Measure/ Single Two Two Single Two Two
Age of Youngest Child Parent, Parents, Parents, Parent, Parents, Parents,
































































































































Sources: U.S. data from Current Population Survey (March 1987); French data from Enquete sur
l'Emploi(1987).
Note: Sample includes women ages 23-58 who are heads of a single-parent family or are wives in
a two-parent family with one or two children under age 18. Two-parent family includes cohabiting
couples. "Full-time employment" indicates 35 or more hours of work last week; "part-time em-
ployment" indicates 1-34 hours. Estimates are computed using sample weights; unweighted esti-
mates are very similar to weighted estimates presented here.
As shown, France's more generous assistance to single parents with young
children does not appear to have permanently depressed the relative employ-
ment rate of single parents: while the employment rate of single parents with
children under age 3 is lower in France than in the United States (43 percent
versus 50 percent), the employment rate of single parents with a child age 3-5
is higher (66 percent versus 61 percent). By contrast, two-parent families with
three or more children have consistently lower employment rates in France (17
percent versus 40 percent for a family with a youngest child age 0-2 and 29
percent versus 49 percent for a family with a youngest child age 3-5). Finally,317 Social Welfare Programs for Women and Children: U.S. vs. France
two-parent families with one or two children have similar employment rates in
both countries, despite the higher transfer payments in France.
2
1
To isolate the impact of each of the time-limited programs addressed here,
this paper will repeat the analysis for two different subsets of the population.
To estimate the impact of the API program, it will focus on women with one
or two children. To estimate the impact of the Parental Education Allowance,
it will focus on married women with children. These estimates are provided
below.
10.3.2 Single-Parent Family Programs (API)
Table 10.3 presents estimates of the difference between the employment
rates of women with a youngest child age 3-5 versus age 0-2 for single- and
two-parent families in each country. These estimates can be used to compute
the estimators of the API program impact outlined in equations (1) through
(3) above.
As shown, the employment rate of French single parents is 22.7 points
higher for women with a youngest child age 0-2 than for those with one age
3-5, compared to a difference of 8.2 points for two-parent families. This yields
a difference-in-difference estimate of the API program impact of 14.5 points
(equation [2]). Part of this difference may reflect unmeasured factors unrelated
to transfer benefits, since U.S. single parents also experienced a 2.1-point gain
in employment relative to two-parent families when their youngest child
reached age 3-5. Thus, the net effect attributable purely to the termination of
French time-limited transfers is 12.4 points, the difference-in-difference-in-
difference estimator of equation (3).
As shown in table 10.3, the impact of the API appears to operate exclusively
through an increase in full-time employment: while the net increase in full-
time employment for single parents was 11.9 points, part-time employment
increased by 0.5 points. The estimates for both full-time and total employment
are significantly different from zero at a 5 percent confidence level.
One problem with this analysis is that it does not control for differences in
demographic characteristics that may affect the trend in employment rates of
single parents in each country. As shown in table 10.4, there are substantial
differences in the characteristics of single parents relative to two-parent fami-
lies in each country. Single parents in the United States have both a higher
relative concentration in minority groups and lower relative educational attain-
ment than do single parents in France. These factors could influence the com-
parison of trends in employment in each country.
21. These comparisons may understate the extent of labor market attachment in France relative
to the United States, since a larger share of nonemployed women in France have ties to a job
through maternity or sick leave.318 Maria J. Hanratty
Table 10.3 DifFerence-in-Difference-in-DifFerence Estimates: Women with 1 or 2
Children (standard errors in parentheses)
Total employment
France (3-5 minus 0-2)
United States (3-5 minus 0-2)
Net change
Full-time employment
France (3-5 minus 0-2)
United States (3-5 minus 0-2)
Change
Part-time employment
France (3-5 minus 0-2)



























































Sources: See table 10.2.
Note: See table 10.2.
aOne-parent family minus two-parent family.
Table 10.5 presents probit estimates of the probability of employment,
which control for demographic characteristics of families in each country. It
presents estimates of the impact on total employment (columns 1-2), full-time
employment (columns 3-4), and part-time employment (columns 5-6).
As shown, the demographic controls perform in the United States roughly
as expected: employment rates are higher for more-educated women, for
women ages 29-39, and for minorities (full-time employment measure only).
In France, the results for age and education have the same sign as those for the
United; States, although the impact of education is smaller and the impact of
age larger in magnitude. In addition, unlike in the United States, minority sta-
tus appears to decrease rather than increase employment in France.
The key variable of interest is the interaction variable, France*single par-
ent*kid35, which corresponds to the difference-in-difference-in-difference es-
timate shown in equation (3).
2
2 As shown, this coefficient is positive and sig-
22. The estimated regression is equivalent to the following equation:
(5) E = 80 + 8,/sTW35 + Swingle + ^Single * Kid35 + S4France +























Mean Characteristics of Women with Children, France versus the









































































































































































































Sources: See table 10.2.
Note: Sample includes women ages 23-58 who are heads of a single-parent family or are wives
in a two-parent family with one or two children uner age 18. Two-parent family includes cohabit-
ing couples. "Full-time employment" indicates 35 or more hours of work last week: "part-time
employment" indicates 1-34 hours. Other variables are defined in appendix B. Estimates are com-
puted using sample weights; unweighted estimates are very similar to weighted estimates pre-
sented here.320 Maria J. Hanratty









































































































































































Sources: See table 10.2.
Note: Sample includes women ages 23-58 who are single parents or wives of a two-parent family
with less than three children. Two-parent family includes cohabiting couples. "Part-time employ-
ment" indicates 1-34 hours of work last week; "full-time employment" indicates 35 or more hours.
Regression includes controls for population size (100,000-199,000, 200,000-1.999 million, or 2
million—!-); these controls enter separately and are interacted with France dummy. N = 32,827.
*Significant at 10 percent confidence level.
**Significant at 1 percent confidence level.
nificant in both the total employment and the full-time employment equations
but is not significant in the part-time employment. These estimates suggest
that the termination of time-limited benefits was associated with an increase in
while the difference-in-difference-in-difference estimator is equivalent to:
(6) (A£/s - Afy - (AEus - A£u/),
where S£ is the difference in employment rates of women with a youngest child age 3-5 versus
age 0-2, / = France, u = United States, 5 = single, and m = married. Substituting in terms from
equation (5), the second term in equation (6) is equal to [(80 + 8, + 82 + 83) - (80 + 82)] - [(80 + 8,) - 80] = 83. Using similar logic, one can show that the first term in equation (5) is equal to
83 + 87. Thus, the difference between these two numbers is 87, the coefficient on France*sin-
gle*kid35 in equation (5).321 Social Welfare Programs for Women and Children: U.S. vs. France
employment, which was driven primarily by an increase in full-time em-
ployment.
The top four rows of table 10.6 present simulations of the implied magnitude
of the estimated impact of time-limited transfers shown in table 10.5. It pres-
ents estimates for both single- and two-parent families in each country who
have a child age 0-2 and who have fewer than three children. For each group
shown, this table uses the parameter estimates of table 10.5 to compute the
average change in predicted employment before and after adding in a term
equal to the coefficient on the interaction variable France*single parent*kid35.
As noted above, this term is intended to capture the impact of time-limited
transfers for single parents in France.
Table 10.6 Simulated Impact of Time-Limited Benefits
Single-parent family benefits (table
10.5)








Large-family benefits (table 10.9)




































Sources: See table 10.2.
Note: Sample includes women ages 23-58 who are heads of a single-parent family or are wives in
a two-parent family with one or two children under age 18. Two-parent family includes cohabiting
couples. "Full-time employment" indicates 35 or more hours of work last week; "part-time em-
ployment" indicates 1-34 hours. The top five rows of this table present simulations of the average
impact of time-limited transfer programs for single-parent families on the employment rates of
women with young children in each country; the bottom five rows present simulations of the im-
pact of time-limited transfers for families with three or more children. For each group, it computes
the average over all individuals of the function 4>(XB + 8) - <$>(XB), where XB is the cross-product
of the vector of personal characteristics and the vector of estimated parameters from table 10.5
(top four rows) or table 10.8 (bottom four rows), and 8 is the estimated impact of time-limited
transfer programs. This table assumes that the impact of time-limited transfers is captured by the
coefficient on the interaction variable France*single*kid35 in table 10.5 and the coefficient on
France*3 children*kid35 in table 10.8 (see text note 22).322 Maria J. Hanratty
As shown in table 10.6, probit estimates imply an increase in the total em-
ployment rate of 10.8 to 11.0 points for each group, slightly less than the esti-
mate from table 10.3 of 12.4 points. As before, this change largely reflects
changes in full-time (9.9 to 10.3 points) rather than part-time employment (0.8
to 1.5 points).
10.3.3 Programs for Large Families (Parental Education Leave)
Table 10.7 presents estimates of the difference in employment between
women with a youngest child 3-5 versus 0-2 years for married women with
children, by number of children in the family (1-2 versus three-plus children).
Following the approach outlined in equation (4), these estimates can be used
to identify the impact of time-limited programs for large families.
As shown, French women with three or more children had an increase in
employment of 3.8 points relative to women with one or two children when
their youngest child reached age 3, compared to a relative decrease for the
United States of 0.1 points. Thus, the difference-in-difference-in-difference
Table 10.7 Difference-in-Difference-in-Difference Estimates, Married Women
with Children
Total employment
France (3-5 minus 0-2)
United States (3-5 minus 0-2)
Net change
Full-time employment
France (3-5 minus 0-2)
United States (3-5 minus 0-2)
Net change
Part-time employment
France (3-5 minus 0-2)



























































Sources: See table 10.2.
Note: Sample includes women ages 23-58 who are wives in a two-parent family with one or two
children under age 18. Two-parent family includes cohabiting couples. "Full-time employment"
indicates 35 or more hours of work last week; "part-time employment" indicates 1-34 hours. Esti-
mates are computed using sample weights; unweighted estimates are very similar to weighted
estimates presented here.323 Social Welfare Programs for Women and Children: U.S. vs. France
estimator is equal to a 3.9-point increase in employment. As shown, most of
this increase reflects a net increase in full-time employment (2.6 points), com-
pared to an increase in part-time employment (1.3 points). None of the esti-
mates presented here is statistically significant at a 5 percent confidence level.
Table 10.8 presents probit estimates of the difference-in-difference-in-
difference estimator, which include demographic controls for age, education,
minority status, and population density. As before, estimates are presented for
total employment (columns 1-2), full-time employment (columns 3-4), and



















































































































































































Sources: See table 10.2.
Note: Sample includes married women ages 23-58 with children under age 18. Two-parent family
includes cohabiting couples. "Full-time" indicates 35 or more hours of work last week; "part-
time" indicates 1—34 hours. Regression includes controls for population size (100,000-199,000,
200,000-1.999 million, or 2 million--!-); these controls enter separately and are interacted with
France dummy. N = 22,178.
*Significantly different from zero at 10 percent confidence interval.
**Significant at 1 percent level.324 Maria J. Hanratty
As shown, the impact of demographic controls is roughly the same as be-
fore. Older women (over age 40) have lower total and full-time employment
rates. Women with higher education levels have higher full-, part-time, and
total employment rates. Minorities appear to work more full time and less part
time in the United States, whereas they have lower rates of employment on all
three employment measures in France.
The variable that corresponds to the difference-in-difference-in-difference
estimator is the interaction variable France*3 children*kid35. This variable is
positive and statistically significant in the total employment and the full-time
employment equation, while it is insignificant in the part-time employment
equation.
The bottom four rows of table 10.6 present estimates of the simulated impact
of this program for two-parent families with a child under age 3 in each coun-
try, disaggregated by number of children (1-2 versus three-plus children). As
shown, these estimates imply a much larger impact of time-limited benefits
than the estimates presented in table 10.7: time-limited benefits increase the
employment rate of French families with three or more children by 6.1 points,
compared to the estimate from table 10.7 of 3.9 points. This reflects an increase
in both full-time (3.6 points) and part-time employment (2.4 points).
Calculations not presented here suggest that the primary reason that the re-
sults are much stronger in the probit specification than in the simple tabulations
of table 10.7 is that each approach assumes a different functional form.
2
3 In
particular, table 10.7 assumes that time-limited benefits have the same absolute
effect on the probability of employment on all groups within the population,
whereas tables 10.6 and 10.8 allow the impact to vary with the initial employ-
ment rate of each group. These estimates may be more sensitive to functional
form than the estimates presented for single parents, because there is a greater
divergence between the employment rates of large and small families than
there is between single- and two-parent families.
10.4 Conclusion
The French model offers a unique resolution to the conflict between social
protection and economic flexibility. France offers extensive social protection
to families when their children are young and then, by cutting back cash trans-
fers and increasing publicly subsidized day care, promotes the work effort of
women when their youngest child reaches age 3. By contrast, the United States
provides cash assistance to single parents until their youngest child reaches age
18, thus encouraging them to rely on welfare on a long-term basis.
23. A probit estimate with no demographic controls produces estimates similar to those pre-
sented in table 10.8, suggesting that the difference is not driven by the addition of demographic
controls. In addition, a linear regression model with the same controls shown in table 10.8 yielded
estimates similar to those found in table 10.7, further confirming that differences in functional
form are causing the estimates to differ.325 Social Welfare Programs for Women and Children: U.S. vs. France
This paper suggests that the French policy of placing a time limit on transfer
payments can provide a powerful incentive for women to enter the labor force.
Simulations suggest that the 40 percent to 44 percent reduction in transfers to
single parents when their youngest child reaches age 3 results in an increase in
their employment rate of 11 points, while the 26 percent to 30 percent reduc-
tion in transfers to families with three or more children increases the employ-
ment rate of large families in France by 6 points. These estimates imply an
elasticity of employment with respect to transfer maximums of 0.55 to 0.59
for single parents and of 1.17 to 1.40 for large families.
2
4
It is not possible at this point to assess whether such a policy would be
advantageous for the United States. To do so, one would want to know more
about how time-limited transfers affect the economic well-being of families
and children. In addition, one would want to know how these policies affect
broader measures of economic flexibility such as entry onto welfare, invest-
ment in education or training, and the educational development of children.
It is clear, however, that the United States would be unlikely to reduce total
short-run expenditures if it adopted the French system of cutting back welfare
and expanding public day care when the youngest child reaches age 3. Assum-
ing the same per child daycare cost and the same dollar reduction in transfers
as found in France, the United States would realize a reduction in expenditures
of $400 per family if it could precisely target daycare subsidies toward the
current AFDC recipient pool.
2
5 However, if as in France the United States were
to make day care broadly available to families with children, its short-run ex-
penditures on families with children would increase substantially.
Finally, it is important to stress that one reason that the French system of
time-limited transfer payments may be effective in integrating women into the
labor force is that France provides extensive support to working families
through its systems of universal public day care, universal medical insurance,
universal family allowances, and federally mandated maternity leave. If these
programs were not also in place, it is not clear that time-limited welfare pro-
grams would have the same impact in the United States as they have had in
France.
24. The much larger elasticity for large families is due to the very low initial employment rate
for this group.
25. This estimate assumes reductions in transfer payments equal to those shown in table 10.1,
a family size distribution equal to that found in the U.S. Current Population Survey (1987), and a
per child cost of public nursery school of $2,100, as documented in Bergmann (1992).326 Maria J. Hanratty
Appendix A
Transfer Programs for Women with Children
(nonelderly, non-health related)
French Programs as of 1 January 1987
The source of the information in this section is Lefebvre (1987). In France,
all family benefits are calculated with respect to a monthly base salary. This
monthly base amount in 1987 was equal to $292 (1990 U.S. dollars).
Family Allowance
The Family Allowance program provides non-means-tested monthly pay-
ments to families with two or more children. Monthly payment varies by num-
ber of children: 32 percent of base amount if two children, 73 percent if three
children, and 114 percent if four children. In addition, the payment is increased
by 9 percent of the monthly base for each child age 10-14 and by 16 percent
for each child age 15 or more, except when the child is the eldest of a family
with fewer than three children.
Family Support Allowance
Non-means-tested monthly payments to children with an absent parent are
provided by the Family Support Allowance. Monthly payment is equal to 30
percent of monthly base if two parents are missing, 22.5 percent if one parent
is missing.
Parental Education Allowance
Parents of three or more children who take leave from employment follow-
ing the birth of a child receive a monthly Parental Education Allowance of
142.57 percent of the monthly base. To qualify, the parent must have worked
at least two years in the ten years preceding the birth of the child and must
completely stop working after the child is born. The allowance is paid until the
youngest child reaches age 3 or the parent reenters the labor force. In the year
before the youngest child reaches age 3, the parent may receive half of the
allowance if he or she works or enters a training program on a part-time basis.
Families may claim only one allowance per family. This allowance may not
be combined with the Young Child Allowance or unemployment insurance;
however, families may combine this payment with Family Allowances.
Allowance to Young Children
The Allowance to Young Children program provides monthly cash payments
of 45.95 percent of the monthly base to families with children under age 3.
The "short form" of this program is not means-tested and lasts from the fourth
month of pregnancy until the third month after childbirth. The "long form" of327 Social Welfare Programs for Women and Children: U.S. vs. France
this program continues until the youngest child reaches age 3 if families meet
an income test: gross family income must fall below $23,700 for a single par-
ent with one child or a two-parent family with one child in which both parents
are working, and below $18,000 for a two-parent family with one child in
which only one parent is working. The income eligibility cutoff increases by
$2,600 if the family has a second child and by an additional $3,100 for the
third and any subsequent child.
Large-Family Supplement
Through the Large-Family Supplement program, a monthly payment of
41.65 percent of the monthly base is available to families who have three or
more children all over the age of 3. To qualify for assistance, the family must
meet an income test (described above, under "Allowance to Young Children").
Return to School Allowance
Low-income families with school-aged children are entitled to the Return
to School Allowance, an annual payment equal to 20 percent of the monthly
base for each child age 6-16 who is registered in school. To qualify for assis-
tance, a family with one child must have total income below $12,600. This
income cutoff is increased by $2,900 for each additional child.
Single-Parent Allowance
The Single-Parent Allowance provides payment to single-parent families
with children under age 3 or to women who have children of any age and have
recently experienced a divorce/separation from or death of spouse. Payments
may be made for twelve consecutive months within eighteen months following
date of divorce, separation, or spouse's death or until youngest child reaches
age 3. Maximum monthly benefit amount for a single parent with one child is
equal to 200 percent of monthly base (150 percent for a pregnant woman) and
is increased by 50 percent of the monthly base for each additional child. The
total benefit is reduced by one dollar for every dollar of countable income.
Countable income does not include the Allowance to Young Children (short
form) or the Return to School Allowance.
Housing Allowance
The Housing Allowance program provides a monthly payment to low-
income households with a dependent child or a dependent elderly or handi-
capped adult. In addition, newly married young (under age 40) couples without
children may qualify for up to five years. Housing must meet minimum quality
standards. The total allowance is determined by the formula:
Housing allowance = K * (L + C — L°), where
K= .90 - Resources / {$24,900 * [1 + (.4 * Number of
children)]}328 Maria J. Hanratty
L = Actual rent up to a ceiling that varies by family size and loca-
tion. Maximum monthly rent is $186 for single individual liv-
ing alone, $220 for a family with one or two dependents, and
$246 for family with three dependents.
C = $55 for a family size of two, with an increment of $9.60 for
each additional family member. This is intended to adjust for
utility costs.
L° = Minimum annual rent contribution of family. This is equal to 0
percent of first $1,650 of annual income, 15 percent of income
between $1,650 and $2,400, 26 percent of income between
$2,400 and $4,800, and 36 percent of income greater than
$4,800. This amount is then increased by $70.
U.S. Transfer Programs as of 1 January 1987
The source of the information in this section is U.S. House of Representa-
tives, Committee on Ways and Means (1987).
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)
AFDC is a joint federal-state program that provides cash payments to low-
income families with children, primarily to single-parent families. Some states
allow two-parent households to receive AFDC under stricter eligibility rules;
however, in 1987, two-parent families represented only 6 percent of all AFDC
families. A 66 percent tax rate on earnings applies for the first four months of
recipiency and rises to 100 percent thereafter. The median state maximum ben-
efit for a family of three is $400 per month (lowest state $133, highest state
$845; the latter is an outlier, as the next highest state pays $696 per month).
Food Stamps
The Food Stamp Program provides low-income families and individuals
with coupons that can be used to purchase food. The federal government estab-
lishes both eligibility and benefit levels. Maximum food stamps benefit is $91
for an individual, $168 for a family of two, $242 for a family of three, $306
for a family of four, and $363 for a family of five. The food stamp benefit is
reduced by $0.30 for every dollar of net income after deductions. Deductions
include (1) a standard deduction of $110, (2) 20 percent of earnings, (3) a
deduction of up to $168 for expenditures on shelter over 50 percent of count-
able income, and (4) a dependent childcare deduction of up to $180.
Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC)
The EITC is available to low-income families with children under age 18. It
does not vary with family size. Credit is 14 percent of earnings to a maximum
of $900. The amount of the credit is decreased by $0.10 for every $1 of earn-
ings above $7,300. Credit is refundable to those without tax liabilities.329 Social Welfare Programs for Women and Children: U.S. vs. France
Appendix B
Data Sources
Current Population Survey (CPS)
The March Current Population Survey is an annual survey of over 60,000
households conducted by the U.S. Bureau of the Census. It contains detailed
information on family demographic characteristics, income, and employment
over the previous year. It is available on tape from the U.S. Bureau of the
Census.
Enquete sur l'Emploi
The Enquete sur l'Emploi is an annual survey of 68,000 households in
France conducted by the Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Eco-
nomiques (INSEE). It contains detailed information on labor force activity and
family demographic characteristics. Unfortunately, it contains limited informa-
tion on family income or income sources. It is available on tape from the
French Observatoire Economique de Paris (OEP).
Sample Construction
The sample includes women ages 23-58 who are heads of a single-parent
family or are wives in a two-parent family with at least one child under age 18.
Since the French data do not make it possible to readily identify subfamilies,
this analysis only includes the primary family in each household.
This analysis defines nonmarried couples living together in the same house-
hold to be equivalent to married couples. In the French data, cohabiting cou-
ples are readily identifiable; in the U.S. data, they must be imputed. Thus,
this analysis assumes that any male and female who live together in the same
household who differ in age by less than ten years are a cohabiting couple. This
process identified as cohabiting couples 4.5 percent of families with children in
France and 1.4 percent of families with children in the United States.
Variable Definitions
The definitions of the variables used in the regression analysis are as
follows:
Employed = 1 if worked one or more hours in
last week
Employed full time = 1 if worked thirty-five or more hours
in last week








Size 2 million +
High school
Post-high school
= 1 if youngest child in family is age
3-5
= 1 if youngest child in family is age
6-17
= 1 if age of mother is less than 28
years
= 1 if age of mother is greater than 40
years
= 1 if mother is nonwhite in the United
States and non-European in France
- 1 if city size is 100,000-199,000
= 1 if city size is 200,000-1.999
million
= 1 if city size is 2 million-plus
= 1 if twelve years of school in United
States or baccaulaureat in France
= 1 if thirteen or more years school in
United States, degree beyond bac-
caulaureat in France
All variables equal zero if they do not satisfy the criteria specified above.
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